

# Defenders Struggle with Prescriptive Base Controls in a Hybrid World

Jason Maynard

Field CTO Cybersecurity Canada

CCIE, CC[N|I|D]P, SFCE, C|EH, RCSS, GICSP, GRID, GPEN, GDAT, GCPN, AWS Cloud Practitioner, AWS Solutions Architect, AWS Security, Azure Fundamentals, Azure Security Engineer

MITRE ATT&CK: CTI, SOC Assessments, Threat Hunting Detection Engineering, Adversary Emulation Methodology, Purple Teaming Methodology

ATTACKIQ: Purple Team, Mitre Att&ck, Breach Attack Simulation

Splunk Power User, Splunk Administrator

# Adversarial Success

# Salt Typhoon

Salt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group, has been implicated in a series of sophisticated cyberattacks targeting global telecommunications providers.

These attacks are characterized by their stealth, persistence, and strategic focus on espionage and data exfiltration.



Elevating defensive capabilities through understanding

# Salt Typhoon: The Capabilities




Tactics	Techniques
Reconnaissance	
Resource Development	
Initial Access	Exploit Public Facing Application (T1190)
Execution	Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)
Persistence	Create or Modify System Process (T1543.003)
Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)
Defense Evasion	
Credential Access	Credential Dumping (T1003)
Discovery	Network Service Discovery (T1046)
Lateral Movement	Remote Services (T1021), RDP Hijacking (T1021.002), SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002), Pass the Hash (T1550.002), Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570), Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210)
Collection	
Command and Control	
Exfiltration	
Impact	Data Manipulation (T1565)



Elevating defensive capabilities through understanding

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Initial Access: Exploit Public Facing Application (T1190)



CVE-2021-26855 (ProxyLogon): Exploited to compromise Microsoft Exchange servers.

CVE-2023-46805: Used to bypass authentication in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN.


CVE-2024-21887: Command injection vulnerability in Ivanti Policy Secure.

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

These exploits allow the group to deploy malware and establish a foothold in the target network.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Execution: Technique: Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)



PowerShell: Used to download additional payloads, such as the GhostSpider backdoor.




Windows Command Shell: Executes commands to enumerate system information and deploy tools for lateral movement.

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

Once inside, Salt Typhoon uses PowerShell and other scripting tools to execute malicious commands.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Persistence: Create or Modify System Process (T1543.003)



Crowdoor Backdoor: Adds registry entries to execute malicious code automatically.




SparrowDoor: A custom backdoor that establishes persistence via DLL search-order hijacking..

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

The group creates Windows services or modifies registry keys to ensure malware persists across reboots.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Privilege Escalation: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068)



```
PS C:\> cd temp\minikatz\minikatz "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" exit
##### minikatz 2.0 alpha (64) release "Kivi en C" (Jun 29 2015 00:28:32)
## * ##
## / \ ## / * * *
## \ / ## Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## v ## http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/minikatz (ee.ee)
##### with 16 modules * * * /

minikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

minikatz(commandline) # misc::skeleton
[INFO] data
[INFO] struct
[INFO] keys patch OK
[INFO] functions
[INFO] init patch OK
[INFO] decompile patch OK

minikatz(commandline) # exit
Eye!
```

LSASS Memory Dumping: Uses tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials from memory.

Token Manipulation: Elevates privileges by impersonating system tokens.

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

Salt Typhoon exploits vulnerabilities or misconfigurations to gain higher privileges



# Attack Path and Common Themes

Lateral Movement: Technique: Remote Services (T1021), Pass the Hash (T1550.002), Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570), Technique: Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210)

The group uses legitimate remote access tools like RDP, SSH, and SMB to move laterally.

- RDP Hijacking (T1021.002): Takes control of existing RDP sessions to access other systems.
- SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002): Accesses shared folders to deploy tools or exfiltrate data.

Technique: Pass the Hash (T1550.002)


- Salt Typhoon uses stolen password hashes to authenticate to other systems without needing plaintext passwords.

Technique: Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570)

- The group transfers tools like PsExec, WinRAR, and custom malware (e.g., GhostSpider) between systems to facilitate movement and data exfiltration.

Technique: Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210)

- Exploits vulnerabilities in remote services (e.g., unpatched SMB or RDP) to gain access to additional systems.




Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

Lateral movement is a critical phase of Salt Typhoon's operations, enabling the group to expand control within the network.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Credential Access: Credential Dumping (T1003)



```
PS C:\> cd temp\minikatz\minikatz "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" exit
.##### minikatz 2.0 alpha (64) release "Yivi en C" (Jun 29 2015 00:28:32)
## * ##
## / \ ## / * * *
## \ / ## Benjamin DELPY "gentilkiwi" ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## v ## http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/minikatz (es.es)
'#####' with 16 modules * * */

minikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

minikatz(commandline) # misc::skeleton
[INFO] data
[INFO] struct
[INFO] kegs patch OK
[INFO] functions
[INFO] ini patch OK
[INFO] decompile patch OK

minikatz(commandline) # exit
Eye!
```


LSASS Dumping: Captures credentials stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

Salt Typhoon uses tools like Mimikatz and ProcDump to extract credentials from memory or disk.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Discovery: Technique: Network Service Discovery  
(T1046)



```
PS C:\> cd temp\minikatz\minikatz "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" exit
##### minikatz 2.0 alpha (64) release "Kivi en C" (Jun 29 2015 00:28:32)
#####
## * ##
## / \ ## / * * *
## \ / ## Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## v ## http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/minikatz (ee.ee)
##### with 16 modules * * */

minikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

minikatz(commandline) # misc::skeleton
[INFO] data
[INFO] struct
[INFO] keys patch OK
[INFO] functions
[INFO] init patch OK
[INFO] decompile patch OK

minikatz(commandline) # exit
Eye!
```


Tools like NBTscan and PowerShell scripts are used to gather information about the network environment

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

The group maps the network to identify additional targets, such as domain controllers and file servers.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041)




Tools like WinRAR are used to compress and encrypt data before exfiltration.

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

Salt Typhoon exfiltrates stolen data (e.g., call records, text messages) over encrypted command-and-control (C2) channels.

# Attack Path and Common Themes

Impact: Data Manipulation (T1565)



GhostSpider Backdoor: Provides persistent access for long-term espionage and potential future disruption.

Note: this is not an exhaustive list, and the adversary always looks at ways to elevate their capabilities.

The group may manipulate or delete data to disrupt operations or cover their tracks.



60% - 70% of all breaches involved lateral movement



Vulnerabilities play a significant role in breaches



Segmentation opportunity for defenders but difficult to operationalize



# Hybrid Mesh Firewall

Cisco Innovation

# Securing the enterprise is increasingly challenging

## Highly distributed, fine-grained apps

- Spanning data center, cloud
- Containers
- 1000s of microservices

## Nothing can be trusted

- Distributed perimeter necessary but no longer sufficient
- Need security in every flow to stop lateral movement

## More vulnerabilities, exploited faster

- Weeks to hours to minutes
- Patching can't keep up
- New AI model risks


AI increasing attack surface and attack sophistication



# Firewalling needs to evolve to meet today's challenges

## OUR NORTH STAR

Make it easy for organizations to **reduce attack surface**, **prevent compromise**, and **stop lateral movement** in the modern data center, cloud, campus, and factory



# Hybrid Mesh Firewall

## Secure Firewall



## Next-Generation Firewall

Price-performance leader | Encrypted traffic at scale | Cloud-native

 Secure Access

 Multicloud Defense


Security Service Edge  
with FWaaS

Cloud  
Firewall




Secure Workload

Leader in traditional microsegmentation  
Highly scalable | Broad platform support | SaaS option




# The network fabric for modern apps

Network | Security | Observability



# Autonomous segmentation Distributed exploit protection




# Security fused into the network

## Hypershield service on Cisco Smart Switches





# Third-party policy enforcement




Threats can be anywhere where best to build controls



No rip and replace

# Security Cloud Control


Hypershield



Hypershield/  
Secure Workload



Hypershield



Enforcement points change, rules don't


# Advanced threat protection

## Preventing modern attacks



Over 95% of data center  
traffic is encrypted

# Traditional approaches to decryption do not scale



AI

# Cisco Encrypted Visibility Engine

Visibility to malicious flows in encrypted traffic *without* decryption

Machine learning  
(ML) technology

Processes **1 B+**  
TLS fingerprints

Processes **10 K+**  
malware samples daily



# EVE changes the game on decryption

Risk-based intelligent decryption, powered by Cisco Encrypted Visibility Engine (EVE)




# The leading IDPS, now with zero-day protection

SnortML extends IDPS protection to unknown variants of common attacks



Known SQL injection attack

Zero-day SQL Injection variant





# Cloud-native Firewall with Firewall Threat Defense

Automated  
Deployment

Auto-  
scaling

Self-  
healing

Enables firewalling at scale across multi-cloud environments

AI Defense

Securing the AI transformation



# Safety

Hallucinations  
Hate speech  
Harassment  
Profanity  
Sexual content & exploitation  
Social division & polarization  
Self-harm  
Disinformation  
Environmental harm  
Violence  
Non-violent crime  
Scams & deception  
Financial harm  
Off-topic  
Cost harvesting / repurposing  
Hallucinations

Cost harvesting / repurposing

**Hallucinations**

Hate speech  
Off-topic

**Toxicity**

Social division & polarization

**Self-harm**

Financial harm

Profanity

Harassment

Indirect prompt injection

**Infrastructure compromise**

IP theft

Meta prompt extraction

**Prompt injection**

Model theft

**Training data poisoning**

Sensitive information disclosure


Data exfiltration

Model denial of service

# Security

IP theft  
Model theft  
Meta prompt extraction  
Infrastructure compromise  
Model compromise  
Training data poisoning  
Targeted poisoning  
Prompt injection  
Indirect prompt injection  
SQL injection  
Command execution  
Cross-site scripting  
Model vulnerabilities  
Model denial of service  
Application denial of service  
Data exfiltration

# AI Defense





Visibility of underlying models and data

Model Validation and guardrail recommendations

Runtime enforcement across public and private clouds

# Delivered via the Hybrid Firewall



# AI Security Journey

Safely enable GenAI across your organization



## Discovery

Uncover shadow AI, apps, models, and data



## Detection

Test for AI risk, vulnerabilities, and adversarial attacks



## Protection


Place guardrails and access policies to secure data and defend against runtime threats



Stopping lateral movement  
Segmentation that works



# Segmentation that meets you where you are



# Optimal segmentation for:


Traditional Workloads

IoT devices

Kubernetes Workloads

MACROSEGMENTATION

MICROSEGMENTATION




Dev

Prod

### Flow-based rule




### Process-based rule



# Smarter firewalling with Secure Workload & ISE

Action	Source	Destination	Protocols / Ports
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Allow	contractors-users	vdesktop-infra	TCP: 443



User based policy using ISE tags inline

ML powered policy discovery

Policies evolve as users and apps change

# Traditional segmentation for workloads



## All types of workloads

Windows | Linux | Cloud



Virtual Machine



BareMetal


## SaaS delivered

Get started quickly without  
hardware investment

## Confident outcomes


Speed up time to value  
with implementation services

# Segment IoT devices using ISE and Firewall





# Cloud-native segmentation for Kubernetes



Discover microservice interactions

Enforce policies in the Kubernetes fabric

# Hypershield: AI-native segmentation that works at scale

ML-Assisted



Autonomous

# Autonomous segmentation



Complete understanding of changing app behavior from network to workload to pre-prod

### Recommendations

- ✓ Permit web app frontend can access database
- ✓ Permit web app frontend can access analytics
- ✓ Permit web app analytics can access database
- ✓ Default observe and permit web app policy group...

Flexible segmentation rules that help avoid app fragility

### Web app

database frontend analytics Kubernetes Service 05 apache server 02

Unusual behavior | Vulnerable database talking to front end

Medium Risk

Block and capture **Recommended**


Approve Create Ticket

Policies updated to stricter rules in response to suspicious events

# Compensating controls Distributed Exploit Protection



# Defender's dilemma



Mitigate known and unknown vulnerabilities

Do it in minutes, not months

All while keeping the app and business running

# Closing the exploit gap with automated workflows

FUTURE

60,234 vulnerable assets



CVE-2024-21626

High Priority

runc. 1.1.11 vulnerability

16,234 vulnerable assets


Cisco Security Risk Score 91 High CVSS 3 9.3

3 Affected zones

Production - External Critical Production - Internal Dev

## Data-driven vulnerability prioritization

- +19 threat and exploit intel feeds
- +12.7B managed vulnerabilities
- +1B security events processed monthly



The Distributed Exploit Shield blocks new container processes with a current directory of "/" in the host name space.

- Block and alert

Surgical mitigating control that keeps application running



The Distributed Exploit Shield was already tested in your environment


Tested against live production traffic to earn trust and increase confidence

# Security Cloud Control Unified Management



# Security Cloud Control

Simplify policy administration  
by up to 70%



AI assistance  
for policy

Proactive  
AIOps

Real world policy  
testing

Some capabilities are future.



# Reduce management overhead with AI ops

Assist

+ Policy configuration

Augment

+ Troubleshooting

Automate

+ Policy lifecycle management

Cisco AI Assistant

You  
Allow Lee access to Facebook but only from office source zone

AI Assistant 11:05 am PST  
Here is your rule recommendation, This rule will be added in policy 'Test\_1' in the category, 'Geo\_Controls'.

Rule Name	Action	Source zone	Destination zone
Rule_Test_1	Allow	Office	guest_zone

AI Assistant 'Rule\_Test\_1' is successfully created in policy 'Test\_1'. 11:05 am  
Congratulations, your rule named, '**Rule\_Test\_1**' is successfully created in policy '**Test\_1**'. The rule is created in a **disabled state** as of now. You can enable it from your 'Test\_1' policy detail page.

[Go to policy detail page](#)

Ask the AI Assistant a question

The AI Assistant may display inaccurate information. Make sure to verify the responses. [View our FAQs](#) to learn more.

# Digital Twin: Upgrades



Primary Data Plane

VERSION 2.0

VERSION 2.1

Shadow Data Plane

## Earns your trust

- EDIT/UPDATE
- TEST REPORTS
- SCHEDULE DEPLOYMENT
- DEPLOY

Packets

PASS

# Digital Twin: Policy Verification

FUTURE

Primary Data Plane

DEPLOYED POLICY


POLICY GROUP A

Shadow Data Plane

## FL O W S

	Primary	Shadow
Flow count	10,234	10,234
Total allowed flows	10,234	10,231
Total denied flows	14,213	14,216

# Security Cloud Control



- Unified coordination of security solutions
- Consistent policy enforcement and object sharing
- Support for hybrid environments including on-premises

