

Fileless attacks, persistence methods and how to hunt them

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Definition of Fileless

The background of the slide features a complex, abstract pattern of overlapping hexagons and lines. Some hexagons are solid, while others are outlines. The lines form a network-like structure, suggesting a digital or data environment. The overall color palette is light gray and white, with the title text in a bold, dark red.

What defines fileless attacks ?

- Malicious code running on a system that ...
 - Did not installed anything
 - Did not dropped anything to disk
 - Usually does not have it's own process
 - Also called "memory-based", "living of the land", "zero-footprint"
 - It uses oldschool techniques for code injection into processes
 - Classic DLL File Injection
 - Reflexive DLL Injection
 - Process Hollowing
 - Thread Execution Hijacking
 - ...



Google Searches Trends on “fileless malware”

Interest over time 



Note




It's a new thing right ?

- Not entirely, some tools/features have given the attack a new twist
 - Powershell specifically
 - WMI
- There are types of fileless attacks , some of them are :
 - Memory-Resident Only
 - Fileless Persistence Methods
 - Malicious Use of System tools
 - Non-PE Based (CoffeShot / JScript)




How does it work ?



Early Fileless

Early Fileless Attacks

- Let's take a walk down memory lane ...
 - Code Red (July 12th 2001)
 - IIS Vulnerability .ida ISAPI
 - ~ 6 million systems infected
 - SQL Slammer (January 25th 2003)
 - Microsoft SQL 2000 servers
 - Doubled in size every 8 minutes
 - Took down routers
- They both were memory only viruses



SQL Slammer and Code Red

- Both leveraged vulnerabilities on software to inject malicious payloads
 - Buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- After exploitation of the vulnerability was done, all injected code :
 - Had functionality to carry on other attacks
 - Finding new systems, checking for vulnerabilities
 - Launching the exploit code against newly find systems
- First versions were non persistent
- Later versions included persistence mechanisms and RAT capabilities



New Fileless

Examples

Poweliks Trojan - 2014

- Initially started as a click fraud trojan (drive-by exploit kits)
- Evolved from being a file-based threat (Wowlinks) to fileless :
 - Shared code included to connect to C2
 - Delete files
 - Hijack CLSID
- Once foothold is gained in a system the malware :
 - Silently visits web pages in a hidden browser window
 - Displays ad on the hidden window as well
 - More malware usually flows through these ad networks
 - Actually installed Windows Updates
 - Starts up watchdog to check if system is being cleaned
 - Persistency with JavaScript loading encoded shellcode from registry
 - Cool trick with the NULL Runkey



Powersniff Trojan - 2016

- Generally arrives in macros in Office documents through Malspam
- In general the emails were targeted
- Macro when enabled and executed calls WMI which :
 - Calls a powershell process
 - With execbypass
 - On a hidden windows
 - Downloads a Powershell file
 - Contains shellcode that is encrypted
 - Same script decode and executes the payload
 - Then perform reconnaissance activities
 - Looking for POS machines



POSHSPY Trojan - 2017

- Research point to APT29 for attribution (Cozy Bear)
- Makes extensive use of native Windows tools (living of the land)
- Use WMI to store and persist the infection
 - Leverages a filter to execute it's payload
 - WindowsParentalControlsMigration Consumer
 - Upon execution, extracted and executed encoded powershell
- Extensive use of evasion mechanisms
 - Infrequent beaconing
 - Traffic obfuscation
 - Extensive encryption



How to hunt for them

Sysmon

- Process Creation and Termination
- Process changing a file creation time.
- Network Connection
- Driver Load
- Image Load
- CreateRemoteThread
- Raw Access Read of a file
- A process opens another process memory
- File Creation
- Registry Events
- Pipe Events
- WMI Permanent Events



OSQuery

- Exposes operating system details as relational tables
- Allows for deep monitoring of system level details
- Versions exists for MacOS, Windows, Linux and FreeBSD
- Growing community, stable codebase, backed by Facebook
- Allows for scheduled queries to be run
- Differential Logging
- File Integrity Monitoring
- YARA for in Memory Hunting
- Query Packs
- Kolide/Doorman/Fleet are solutions that allows scaling




Powershell Tools and Other Tools

- PSSysmonTools
- PSHunt
- PSReflect (Get-Injected-Thread / GetMemorySegment)
- UpRoot
- PowerForensics
- SeatIBelt
- Flare-WMI / python-cim
- RedLine
- Volatility



Windows Configuration and Logging

- PowerShell constrained Mode
- Script Tracing and Logging
- Powershell Transcripts



Demo Time

- Use Metasploit to serve a web page with an exploit
- Old exploit ms11_003, targeting Windos 7 SP1
- The idea is to just inject shellcode in memory
- Then use powershell to identify suspicious threads
- Dump that thread
- Open that up in IDA



The image features the FERTINET logo centered on a solid red background. The logo consists of the word "FERTINET" in a bold, white, sans-serif font. The letter "E" is stylized with three vertical bars. To the right of the word is a registered trademark symbol (®). The background is decorated with a pattern of white, semi-transparent hexagons of various sizes and orientations, some of which are nested or overlapping, creating a complex, geometric design.

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