




Block This Way: Securing Identities using Blockchain

James Argue, Stephen Curran



BC Ministry of Citizens' Services

February 7, 2018



The Identity on the Internet Challenge

The Internet was built without a way to know who and what you are connecting to.¹



"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

¹ Kim Cameron – Architect of Identity, Microsoft Corporation
<https://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf>

The Evolving Addition of Identity to the Internet

- Fundamentals: Modern Cryptography
 - Data encryption for safe storage and transfer
 - Key management – traditional approaches
- Self-Sovereign Identity - Verifiable Digital Identity
 - Requirements
 - Enabling Technologies – Decentralized IDs, Blockchain and Verifiable Claims
 - Building the concept of “Web of Trust”
- Along the Way: Performances and Demonstrations
 - Cryptography basics , Blockchain and Verifiable Claims

Your Guides

- James D. Argue, Ministry of Citizen Services, BC Government
 - Team Lead, Network Security Architect, Information Security Branch
 - CISSP, MCSE
- Stephen Curran, Cloud Compass Computing, Inc.
 - The Verifiable Organizations Network (VON) Project
 - Ministry of Technology, Innovation and Citizens' Services, BC Government
- Maher Boudani, University of Victoria (Co-Op)
 - The Verifiable Organizations Network (VON) Project
 - Ministry of Technology, Innovation and Citizens' Services, BC Government

Over to James...

Block This Way: Securing Identities using Blockchain

Decentralized Identity, Blockchains and Verifiable Claims

Verifiable Organizations Network (VON)

MTICS - Government of BC

February 7, 2018

The Evolving Addition of Identity to the Internet

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Self-Sovereign Digital Identity

Lifetime portable identity for any person, organization, or thing that does not depend on any centralized authority and
can never be taken away

Current Identity Handles


- Name - Stephen Curran (not unique)
- Phone Number - 250-857-1096 (changes, central auth, can be taken away)
- Email Address - swcurran@cloudcompass.ca (changes, central authority)
- URL - www.linkedin.com/in/stephen-curran-4146321 (same issues)
- SIN/SSN/DL - Unique, central authority
- Biometrics - Unique, but if compromised...

From Centralized to Decentralized

- CAs are out as the suppliers of authority
- Elements:
 - Asymmetric keys (crypto) for all identity owners - including citizens
 - Decentralized IDs - DIDs - are the promised SSI Identifiers
 - Blockchain - the Distributed Key Management System (DKMS) platform
 - DIDs are registered and found on a Blockchain
 - Non-Correlation is paramount
 - Verifiable Claims
 - Trust built on evidence

Asymmetric Crypto - Keys

- What James talked about...
- Public and Private Keys
- Proof of Digital Identity = Proof of Control of Private Key
 - Can read and respond to messages encrypted with Public Key



Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)


DID Syntax (W3C)

`did:sov:3k9dg356wdcj5gf2k9bw8kfg7a`



DIDs and DID Documents

{ “Key”: “Value” }



Lookup a DID to find a (JSON) DID Document

DID Doc

1. DID

2. Set c

a.

3. Set c


Published

```
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/did/v1",
  "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
  "publicKey": [{
    "id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1",
    "type": "RsaSigningKey2018",
    "owner": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
    "publicKeyPem": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY...END PUBLIC KEY-----\r\n"
  }],
  "authentication": [{
    // this key can be used to authenticate as DID ...9938
    "type": "RsaSignatureAuthentication2018",
    "publicKey": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1"
  }],
  "service": [{
    "type": "ExampleService",
    "serviceEndpoint": "https://example.com/endpoint/8377464"
  }]
}
```

containing:

Blockchain - in 60 seconds (120? More?)

- A write-once (immutable) database – a shared ledger
- Implemented across many nodes on a peer-to-peer network
- Write process:
 - Pending writes (transactions) are broadcast to all write nodes
 - Hashing applied to build chained immutable blocks – broadcast back to network
 - Demo of mining: <https://anders.com/blockchain/hash.html>
 - Consensus algorithm to agree on the “next block” to create a single chain



Blockchain - in 60 seconds (120?) (more??)

- “Chaining” makes it really, really hard to change historical records
 - and really easy to detect when someone is trying to do so
- Public/Private Key used to prove:
 - Identity – prove control
 - Access rights – prove you have the resource

Blockchain Governance Models

		Validation	
		Permissionless	Permissioned
Access	Public	Bitcoin, Ethereum, IOTA, Veres One	Sovrin, IPDB
	Private	N/A	Hyperledger (Fabric, Sawtooth, Iroha), R3 Corda, CU Ledger

Blockchain and DIDs

- Public DIDs and DID Documents go on the Blockchain
 - We'll get to private ones
- Result: Distributed Key Management System with no central authority
 - If I have your DID, I can:
 - Find out your public keys (that's a good thing!)
 - Only you will understand my message (you have the private key)
 - Find out endpoints I can use to contact you
 - **Warning:** Many details glossed over...
- General rule - on any public Blockchain - NO PRIVATE DATA
 - Even if it is encrypted!

DIDs and Non-Correlation

- Prevent monitoring public activity to learn about identities
 - Data at rest - e.g. DIDs on the Blockchain, DIDs in databases
 - Email, SSN, Phone Number, etc.
 - Data in motion – e.g. connections between websites
- Solution - pair-wise DIDs
 - Each identity owner doesn't have just one DID
 - They have one **per** relationship
 - Bank, Government Service 1, Gov't Service 2, Email Server, Father, etc.
 - Pair-wise DIDs are private between the participants
 - No way to understand them
 - No way to correlate activities between them
 - Private DIDs need not go on the Blockchain - just shared between the participants
 - Protocol to establish connection between identities

REVIEW: From Centralized to Decentralized

- CAs are out as the suppliers of authority
- Elements:
 - ✓ Asymmetric keys (crypto) for all identity owners - including citizens
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 - ✓ Blockchain - the Distributed Key Management System (DKMS) platform
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
Private, asymmetric key encrypted, pairwise communication channels.


What can we do now?

- Verifiable Claims
- Trust built on evidence

Verifiable Claims - W3C Standard

Cryptographically signed data exchanged between identities





- Cryptographically signed:
 - Disclosed with consent of Person
 - Issued by the Issuer (via DID)
 - Held by the Prover
 - Name: John Smith
 - Has Bank Account: True
 - Client For > 3 Years: Yes
 - Not tampered with
 - Not revoked

- Exercise for Verifier
 - Do I trust the issuer?

Features of Verifiable Claims

- Deep, deep crypto
 - Not just encrypt/decrypt but use of signing and beyond for proof of issuer, holder
- Selective Disclosure
 - Select information - only some fields from claim – eg. at Pub



Features of Verifiable Claims

- Verification is between **Holder** and **Verifier**
 - No information goes to the Issuer
 - Information on the blockchain is accessed:
 - Schema Information - structure of the data
 - Claim Issuer Data - links Schema, Issuer, Revocation Registry

Exercise for the Verifier – do they **TRUST** the Issuer?


Trust Framework

A set of business, legal, and technical rules which members of a community agree to follow in order to achieve trust online

Business Policies

Legal Policies

Technical Policies



Trust Framework Examples

- DIACC Pan-Canadian Trust Framework
 - <https://diacc.ca/2016/08/11/pctf-overview/>
- Sovrin Trust Framework
 - International Non-Profit - <http://www.sovrin.org>
 - Board of Trustees - 12 Members - Governs Trust Framework
 - Controls selection of Stewards - permissioned blockchain operators
 - Technical Governance Board
 - Governs Open Source foundation code
 - Linux Foundation's HyperLedger Indy project
 - Sets technical policies implemented in software
- There are others building decentralized identity frameworks and systems



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
- ✓ Verifiable Claims
- ✓ Trust built on evidence

Exchange trusted, signed, verifiable data

Privacy By Design

- DIDs and Keys - proof of identity - controlled by Identity Owner
 - Not by central stores - Google, Facebook
 - Nirvana: No passwords - just a connection based on DIDs
 - Adding the currently missing Identity Layer to the Internet
- Verifiable Claims - held by Identity Owner
 - Data may not need to be held by issuer - risk mitigation
 - Retrieve data from Owner only as needed - as Verifiable Claim
 - E.g. Name, Address, Credit Card number
 - The only data held - a bunch of uncorrelateable DIDs - no value to hackers
 - Data disclosure controlled by Identity Owner
 - Consent
 - Selective disclosure
 - Nirvana: Unverifiable data is useless - must include proof of issuer/holder

Sample Self-Sovereign Network Architecture



SSI In Action - BC Government's VON Project




VON

Verifiable Organizations Network

Chicken and Egg Problem

- Citizens don't have wallets so can't interact with SSI-enabled Services
- Services aren't SSI-enabled because citizens don't have wallets



VON Project - BC Government Experiment

TheOrgBook¹ is to bootstrap Verifiable Claims for Organizations using Public Data

- Government services that print permits extended to “print” verifiable claims
- **Public** Verifiable Claims sent to TheOrgBook - a central claims repository
- Other services can use Verifiable Claims from TheOrgBook
 - Clean data
 - No repeated typing
 - Very lightweight integration - no MOU
- A discovery service for Organizations

¹ TheOrgBook is to SSI as TheFaceBook was to Social Networks

The Result?



- ✓ Identity-Enabled Services – one-side of the market
 - ✓ Services receiving, creating Verified Claims
 - ✓ Patterns (and code!) to SSI-enable more Services

Demo - TheOrgBook

<https://devex-von-test.pathfinder.gov.bc.ca/home>

Workshop- What's on the Ledger?

- Use Case: Permitify - Getting a Restaurant Permit in Surrey
- Traditional
 - Contact multi-levels of government - in order
 - Enter same information over and over
 - Bring necessary paperwork to prove steps completed
- With TheOrgBook
 - Services are SSI-enabled and can use TheOrgBook
 - Future: Can use Organization's Wallet or TheOrgBook
 - Recipes of steps to meet business goal: Open A Restaurant
 - Retrieve claims from TheOrgBook based on foundational ID – BC Registries Incorporation
 - Reduce re-typing, need for in-person proofs

Workshop – What's on the Ledger?

- We'll go Step by Step through process
 - Initialize the Blockchain
 - Initialize the services
 - Generate claims
 - Request proofs - deliver proofs based on claims
- Throughout Showing:
 - What goes on the Blockchain?
- Want to play along?

<http://138.197.170.136>

Recap - Looking Forward

- Foundational Technology - Asymmetric Keys - Public/Private
- Centralized and Decentralized Key Management Systems
- Self-Sovereign Identity
 - DIDs, DID Documents and Blockchains
 - Verifiable Claims
- Privacy by Design
 - Data controlled by Identity Owner
 - Used for login
 - Used for proving “things” to verifiers
- Trust Frameworks
 - You can trust the mechanics (e.g. issuer, holder, tampering, revoked)
 - Can you trust the participants of the network?

Interested in Learning More?

<https://von.pathfinder.gov.bc.ca/>

swcurran@cloudcompass.ca